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Full text of "Poland Russia and Great Britain 1941-1945"

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and it can be safely assumed that Russia would not acknowledge the
promises and guarantee given by England. Furthermore., whatever order
and government, having the c confidence of the three Powers concerned/
was to be finally established in Poland., it would obviously be a government
ordered by the Power most concerned  the one on the spot. Such a
government (a projection of this Power and backed by its military
forces), would have every opportunity of destroying the former state
organisation and replacing it by the political system of its c Protector.'

By the autumn of 1944, t'ie ^ea^ between the Big Three at Teheran
was no longer concealed. Churchill's attitude towards the Polish Govern-
ment and his public speeches, beginning from February 22, 1944, were
not only in support of the Russian territorial demands, but were also
directed against the very existence of Poland itself. Never had the future
of that country appeared so black. One of the leading Polish political
writers, K. Mackiewicz, pointed out,
" the British policy towards Russia is based on an appeasement which is
more fundamental than the Munich appeasement towards Germany . . *
The English do not wish the Russo-German antagonism to disappear, and
that is the reason why they endeavour to ensure that these two countries
have a common frontier for a line of friction. The further Russia advances
westward the surer is Russo-German antagonism. The Anglo- Soviet
friction in the Middle East, in China and even in the Baltic, is a further
incentive which encourages the English to push the Russian frontier west-
ward.
" In a system of this kind there is a place for Poland only in the Russian
political orbit. Viewed in the light of these facts, Churchill's words re-
garding Poland c achieving a friendship with Russia,' as the result of the
annexation of her eastern provinces by the Soviets, can have no other
meaning. It is not a question of friendship, but merely that Russia should
keep us within the sphere of her influence.
"... England has supported us, and now would also be willing to help
us, for the English have much sympathy and gratitude towards us, but in
the pattern of the policy which England has chosen to follow, there is
nothing much she can do for us."
In this extract, it was evident that the Polish writer was heading towards
the assumption that Churchill's policy was to accept for Poland that idea
already so clearly expressed by Lloyd George in 1915, when the future of
Poland was still in the air. He wrote in his memories (Vol. Is p. 881) : 
" If Germany were relieved of all fear of pressure from Russia, and were
at liberty to turn her whole strength towards developing her western am-
bitions, France and Britain might be the sufferers, and I am not by any
means confident that cutting off Russia from her western neighbours might
not divert her interests towards the Far East to an extent which British
statesmen could not view without some misgivings. The more Russia is
made a European rather than an Asiatic Power, the better for everybody.
" I therefore conclude that the solution of the Polish question which
would best suit our interests would be the constitution of a Poland endowed
with a large measure of autonomy, while remaining an integral part of the
Russian Empire."
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